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I. Shrinking Electoral Margins and Shifting
Congressional Ideology

In the United States, there is a unique relationship between voters and elected
officials. Within this relationship sits the process of elections, which occurs every two
years for US House candidates. Essentially, elected officials work within the context of
continual electoral demands. Yet, how does this pressure affect the ideology and voting
behavior of representatives? There are numerous academic studies that have discussed
the effects of electoral pressure on elected officials. By understanding the relationship
between election results and congressional voting behavior, we can develop a better
understanding of how our elected officials work toward the goals of our nation.
This study attempts to gain a better understanding of what affects congressional
voting. Specifically, will a congressman moderate his voting behavior in the face of
shrinking electoral margins? For example, let us assume that Congressman X won his
2000 election by a margin of five percentage points. Yet, in 2002, Congressman X faced
a particularly weak challenger. Therefore, he won by a much more comfortable margin of
twenty percentage points. We should then assume that the congressional voting behavior
of Congressman X will become increasingly extreme during the coming term. Because
Congressmen are inherently ideologically extreme, the increase in winning margin allows
Congressman X to polarize his voting behavior. Several studies regarding congressional
voting behavior are cited in the discussion of whether this hypothesized relationship
between voting trends and electoral results actually exists.
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A. ELECTIONS

For a research project on shifting ideology, it is important to first understand the
nature of elections in American politics. How does the environment and frequency of
elections affect the American political realm? Congressional election results alone are not
sufficient to understand the political process and voting ideology. Many scholars focus on
the institution of continual electoral pressure as the principal explanation for political
incapacity and congressional stalemate in the House.
Gary Jacobson sees congressional elections as a complex arrangement of multiple
working plots and strategic goals. He also considers electoral influence on the behavior of
elected leaders. Jacobson believes that elections shape the course led by our elected
officials (Jacobson, 2004, 3). In effect, congressmen vote and attempt to hold office
within the confines of a complicated balancing act. However, Jacobson notes that the
coherence of electoral coalitions has arisen in Congress, which has subsequently
“contributed to greater consistency in voting behavior” (Bond, 2002, 19). Party loyalty
among voters has risen, while ticket splitting has diminished since the 1970s (Bond,
2002, 19).
Scholars have also noted that presidential vote totals can serve as a vital indicator
of congressional electoral activities. Jacobson discusses this facet of voting behavior in
the context of the rise of party loyalty. Jacobson states that “the simple correlation
between a party’s district-level House and presidential vote shares has risen sharply from
its low point in 1972” (Bond, 2002, 20). Presidential election results indicate a high level
of efficiency of Republican congressional districts. For example, although Vice President
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Al Gore outpolled George W. Bush by several hundred thousand votes nationally in the
2000 presidential election, Bush outpolled Gore in 238 House districts in 2002 (after
redistricting). Thus, Jacobson demonstrates that Republican redistricting put Democrats
at a significant structural disadvantage in the House (Jacobson, 2004, 251).
Meanwhile, David Mayhew has suggested several theoretical views on
congressional elections. In his study on vanishing electoral marginals (1974), Mayhew
focused on House elections on a macro scale. Mayhew was interested in net election
shifts per Congress, rather than shifts in particular districts. According to Mayhew’s
research, elections have always been heavily won by incumbents. Yet, he suggests that if
the trends of the 1960s hold, we may be witnessing a further “blunting of a blunt
instrument” (Mayhew, 1974, 314). Mayhew’s notion of vanishing marginals speaks to the
core of a hypothesis concerning shifting ideology for electoral success. Have
representatives “gotten better” at achieving reelection, and has it been at the expense of
consistent political ideology?
Mayhew additionally outlines this general trend in his book, The Electoral
Connection (1975). Mayhew’s work focuses on the hypothesis that reelection is the
primary concern of congressional incumbents. Mayhew notes that “all members of
Congress have a primary interest in reelection. Some members have no other interest”
(Mayhew, 1975, 16). Reelection has become the principal goal of elected officials, and
thus, it is expected that shifts in ideology will occur alongside rises in reelection rates.
This would explain why shifting voting behavior occurs in the face of electoral pressure.
However, Mayhew’s thesis must be scrutinized. As has been seen in
congressional data since Mayhew’s publication in 1974, there has actually been a
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deepening party differential in the last thirty years. Keith Poole (1997) and Alan
Abramowitz (2001) cite the increasing role of party leadership and party identification in
the last thirty years. Although Mayhew’s theory remains a quintessential text for studying
congressional elections, Abramowitz notes that it was published in 1974, “at what may
have been the low point of party influence in Congress during the twentieth century”
(Abramowitz, 2001, 257). Nevertheless, the ineffectiveness of Mayhew’s hypothesis does
not debunk the connection between voting behavior and electoral results. Rather, it
simply complicates the direction of a possible causal connection.
Lastly, Robert Erikson and Gerald Wright suggest that “elections contribute
significantly to achieving congressional representation” (Erikson, 1980, 91). Erikson
argues that Republican challengers are more conservative than Republican incumbents,
and likewise, that Democratic challengers are more liberal than Democratic incumbents
(Erikson, 1980, 95). Essentially, Erikson maintains that elections place a different set of
pressures on those in office from those attempting to gain office. Representation will be
discussed in more detail in the next section, but Erikson’s theory would suggest that
House member ideology is better predicted by district opinion than by party affiliation
(Erikson, 1980, 96).

B. REPRESENTATION

Representative government serves as an important intermediary between elections
and ideology. As previously discussed, there have been competing theories proposed on
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the role of congressional representation. Under what is termed as the popular model of
representative democracy, an elected official is a delegate to his constituents. His role is
to serve the voting interests of his constituents. Yet, this model is one of the more
idealistic models of voting. It presumes that the constituency of an elected official will be
active enough to fully convey majority issue positions, or respond to media-based
surveys on such topics. Through Madison’s Federalist no. 10, majority rule came to be
regarded as tyranny of the masses. Instead, a responsible model is a more useful account
of American politics for the electorate (Erikson, 1980, 92). The responsible model
classifies our elected officials as trustees whom we elect to represent us because we
believe in their general viewpoints and decision making ability.
Through the responsible model, representation is recognized as a unique interplay
between constituent affairs and congressional voting. Although congressmen are
generally receptive to constituent positions on key votes, representatives will often vote
their conscience on issues close to them. This interaction between representatives and
their constituents is significant in a discussion on voting ideology. Are changes in
congressional voting behavior the product of representatives acting as delegates? Or,
from a somewhat pessimistic standpoint, are such shifts representationally expensive
attempts to gain reelection? In either case, the theory implies that there exists a
relationship between electoral pressure and congressional voting behavior.
According to Morris Fiorina, the relationship between constituent influences and
representatives varies widely among representatives (1982). Specifically, Fiorina notes
that “a high degree of electoral competition ‘sensitizes’ a representative to constituents’
preferences” (Fiorina, 1982, 4). Fiorina’s studies on constituent effects report fairly weak
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relationships between constituency characteristics and congressional voting behavior
(Fiorina, 1982, 19). Yet, in understanding Fiorina’s argument, there is a critical
distinction between his work and this paper’s contention that diminishing electoral results
lead to a moderation of voting ideology. Fiorina’s focus is on constituent attentiveness
and its role on congressional behavior. Although constituent activity is important,
Fiorina’s study is more focused and based upon substantially less data than this study.
Meanwhile, Douglas Arnold has also written on representation and its relationship
between ideology and constituent behavior. Arnold (1990) looks at representation and
theorizes on how exactly Congress comes to adopt its policies. Arnold believes that
decision making by representatives is heavily constrained by citizens and coalition
leaders. In essence, congressmen are constantly being squeezed on both ends. This
interaction between party goals and constituent desires leads congressmen to walk a tight
rope that can “impel legislators to support policies that serve either particularistic or
general interests” (Arnold, 1990, 6). By proposing that political action is based upon the
tug of war between varying interests, Arnold suggests that congressional voting behavior
is at least partially, if not mostly, influenced by a representative’s electoral and party
status.
Nevertheless, the role of congressional representation was examined by Miller
and Stokes in 1968 (Erikson, 1980, 101). Miller and Stokes hoped to determine whether a
correlation exists between constituency opinion and representative policy positions. The
correlation they found was remarkably low, yet some have suggested that this study had
severe sampling errors. Erikson believes that the study indicates flaws in the “traditional
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test of constituency-representative correlations,” and that constituency opinion is strongly
related to representation (Erikson, 1980, 101).

C. IDEOLOGY

The third quintessential component of studies regarding congressional voting is
political ideology. The essence of representation manifests itself in the ideological views
of each congressman serving in the United States House of Representatives. Not only is
ideology manifested through representation, but ideology serves as a benchmark measure
to “size up” our elected officials. The flow of congressional action can be described as a
circular pattern. Elections lead to representation by a congressman, which is then judged
by the voting public through a dissection of that representative’s voting ideology. In
theory, if the majority of that voting population approves of its representative’s
ideological voting patterns, he will be reelected, thus making ideology a significant value
in measuring representation and electability.
A noteworthy sum of literature on congressional ideology has focused on the
history of voting behavior. Richard Elling (1982) used the US Senate as a benchmark to
study whether senators vote differently depending on how deep they are within their
term. Because senators have a six year gap between elections, it is possible that voting
behavior may differ greatly in year two as opposed to year six of a senator’s term. Elling
remarks that some ideological moderation usually occurs during the final years of a
senator’s term, and patterned instability did shift, generally, in the direction of ideological
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moderation (Elling, 1982, 75). Late-term ideological moderation would support the
theory that elections play a role in congressional ideological moderation.
Thomas Stratmann (2000) has taken a similar approach to voting behavior within
congressional terms. However, Stratmann examines aggregate voting over congressional
careers rather than within single terms. According to Stratmann’s model, junior
congressmen are more likely to vote with their party, thus holding a fairly ideological
line. Party line voting and variability of voting decision does decrease with seniority
though. Lastly, Stratmann observes that voting behavior often shifts, particularly after
redistricting of congressional districts. Because seniority is generally positively correlated
with increasing electoral margins (safe seats), we can take his study as support that
congressional voting will moderate during times of electoral stress.
Similarly, party leadership plays a vital role in the ideological platform of each
party. Abramowitz (2001) notes the increasing role of party leadership in general politics
and party cohesion. According to Abramowitz, party leaders “no longer leave members
alone” when it comes to voting behavior (Abramowitz, 2001, 258). Further, party leaders
are supposed to represent the ideal values and direction of the party, which plays an
enormous role in contemporary politics. Party leaders are often quite ideological during
their time at the helm of their party.
Meanwhile, Amihai Glazer and Mark Robbins (1985) also use the general
occurrence of redistricting as their benchmark for studying shifting ideology among
congressmen. Their data generally concur with Stratmann’s: congressmen who
successfully gain reelection in redistricted constituencies are those who have shifted their
voting behavior to match their new electorate. This supports the notion that incumbent
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vulnerability is dependent on an elected official creating policy congruity between
himself and his constituents (Whitby, 1986).
Nonetheless, it is important to focus on dissenting views regarding the theory of
congressional strategic moderation. Robert Bernstein (1988) proposes there is little
evidence that senators moderate their ideology due to upcoming reelection bids.
According to Bernstein, it is a misnomer that approaching elections lead senators to
moderate their voting behavior. Such a hypothesis assumes that the median voter in a
district will be closer to the senator’s opponent, which does not always occur (Bernstein,
1988, 238). In fact, certain representatives may become increasingly ideological leading
up to an election due to a variety of factors, including attempts to acquire financial and
human resources by mobilizing the strength of the representative’s party. A study on
changes in voting behavior must take ancillary circumstances into account when
attempting to accumulate a general trend of ideological shifts.
Lastly, Kalt and Zupan (1990) use an economically-based model to study
ideological shirking among congressmen. Termed “Principal-Agent Slack”, Kalt and
Zupan believe that electoral slack given to senators allows them to act within their own
ideological boundaries (Kalt and Zupan, 1990, 105). In discussing their results of
senatorial ideological shirking, Kalt and Zupan reflect on the implications of ideological
shifting by congressional leaders:
To denote the ideology residual as ideological shirking amounts to saying that marginally
uncaptured legislators vote their convictions. The normative implications of this
conclusion turn on views of both the proper purpose of representatives in a democracy
and the aggregate performance of representative democracy. (Kalt and Zupan, 1990, 128)
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D. THREE THEORIES OF IDEOLOGY/REPRESENTATION INTERPLAY

From the aforementioned discussion on elections, representation, and ideology,
the interplay between constituent behavior and representative ideology can be classified
under three main theories. The first theory on electoral behavior advocates that
congressmen are inherently ideologically extreme. Electoral success determines how
much intrinsic ideological polarity a congressman can display in his voting behavior.
Some scholars have suggested that landslide congressional elections serve as a mandate
to House members, allowing them to enact change in whatever manner they see fit.
Accordingly, after a strong showing in an election cycle, “Members of the advantaged
party will be emboldened by new evidence of electoral support for their preferred
positions” (Peterson, 2003, 413). All legislators hold policy positions that rest fairly
conservative or liberal, however, it is the leeway provided by sweeping election returns
that will decide how accurately legislators can represent their own views through their
voting record.
Meanwhile, an alternative, more constituent-driven theory of congressional
behavior suggests that congressional voting trends are a response to constituent demands.
Whereas the former theory states that each legislator wishes to advocate his own, inherent
views, the latter theory suggests that congressional voting ideology aligns in response to
cues from the electorate. Erickson suggests that changes in policy representation “may
also be the result of candidates responding directly to district ideology” (Erickson, 1980,
103). Similarly, the work of Bernstein (1988) and Glazer (1985) observes that
congressional voting behavior is primarily driven by constituent opinion.
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As Morris Fiorina suggests, the representative is purposive in his voting behavior,
and this is why he aligns his votes with his constituency. As Fiorina notes, “his votes are
not simply passive responses to role expectations, group memberships, and interest group
pressures…[but] with an eye toward achieving valued consequences” (Fiorina, 1974, 29).
Representatives value the offices in which they serve, and reasonability in voting (voting
with district preferences) will help to ensure representatives maintain these positions. As
Fiorina bluntly states, “realistically or cynically as the case may be, we believe that
constituents’ preferences are reflected in a representative’s voting primarily through his
concern for his electoral survival” (Fiorina, 1974, 31).
Finally, a third theory of ideological influences, promoted by Marc Hetherington
(2001), suggests that the relationship between representatives and constituents is different
than the model suggested by Erickson and Fiorina. According to Hetherington, as the
ideology of legislators becomes increasingly conservative or liberal, the ideology of the
public will subsequently shift in the same direction. Hetherington proposes that elite
polarization clarifies public perceptions of ideological differences between the parties,
creating an increasing ideological divide among the public (Hetherington, 2001, 619).
Whereas Erickson and Fiorina believe that legislators act in accordance with the cues
provided by their constituents, Hetherington believes that constituents actually follow the
cues of their legislators, and by extension, cues provided by the parties. At that point,
representatives consequently shift their behavior to mirror their constituency, creating an
inexhaustible cycle of shifting ideology. Party separation has increased in the last twenty
years, and subsequently, Americans today are more likely to think about one party
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positively and one negatively than thirty years ago (Hetherington, 2001, 628). Thus, the
increasing ideological polarization of Congress has created a more partisan electorate.

E. FINAL NOTES

Constituent behavior leads to representation through elections. Representation in
each district leads to varying congressional ideologies. Logically, the next conclusion
would be that constituent behavior creates the ideologies that represent them in Congress.
The idea that the voting populace can affect congressional ideology is the critical
backbone of research on shifting voting ideology. Does electoral pressure have the
institutional clout to shift the ideology of Congress? The aforementioned theories,
although conflicting in different facets, all hold one critical component in common: there
is a correlation between congressional voting behavior (ideology) and electoral success
(public opinion). The general consensus of the academic community is that shifts in
congressional voting behavior may vary based on electoral pressure, but the dynamics of
the relationship are not universally agreed upon.
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II. Data and Methods: Shifting Congressional
Ideology

Although studies of the US Congress are often qualitative, quantitative studies can
provide a superlative angle for analyzing lawmaking. As has been noted in previous
sections, there exists a unique relationship between electoral results and congressional
voting behavior. This research project hypothesizes that congressional ideological
extremity will vary based on electoral success. However, there are numerous variables
that can affect congressional voting behavior. This research focuses on the House of
Representatives, and it employs quantitative analysis of congressional ideology in the US
House of Representatives.
There are several advantages of focusing on Congress from a quantitative angle.
Foremost, quantifying this information allows research to examine a large amount of
data, spanning the most recent 106 years of the US House of Representatives.
Theoretically, using data through all 107 Congresses would be better, however this
created several logistical problems. First, much of the election data for early
congressional races is either missing or erroneous. Second, a steady two party foundation
did not take hold immediately in the United States. Rather, many earlier congressional
elections exhibited a multiple party dynamic that would have a confounding affect on the
analysis.
Regardless, a quantitative study using 106 years of data makes it possible to
theorize about various types of congressional behavior, often occurring over a long
period of time. Additionally, a quantitative approach minimizes the influx of selection
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bias. Introduction of error is a critical concern of any researcher, and the use of an
unbiased, comprehensive quantitative design can go a long way to preventing error from
minimizing the results of political research.
Yet, many studies of congressional behavior have approached the topic from a
perspective of participant observer. Although such studies provide the researcher with a
first-hand look at congressional decision-making, qualitative studies on Congress present
several disadvantages. First, many instances of significant political behavior are not
accessible to examination (Johnson and Reynolds, 2005, 194). Also, participant
observation can sometimes, often unintentionally, become plagued with observer bias.
Moreover, a researcher may form a perfectly unbiased and structured research plan, yet
the results of his case studies may simply prove unrepresentative of congressional
behavior as a whole (Johnson and Reynolds, 2005, 195). Because the purpose of this
study is to generate a better understanding of the effects of electoral pressure on
congressional voting behavior as a whole, its hypotheses and methodology will be
grounded in exhaustive quantitative research methods.

A. DATA

Seemingly, the dependent variable of this study should be a measure of the net
change in ideology. However, how is one supposed to measure changes in ideology
simply through examination of the congressional voting record? To achieve this goal, a
set of numerical ideological scores can be used to calculate this change. The most
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contemporary and significant data set in existence on ideology through congressional
voting was created by two scholars, Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal (2005). Poole
and Rosenthal describe voting behavior not as a set of factions, but instead as a
continuum of flexible positions (Poole, 1997, 4). This continuum effectively breaks down
along ideological lines, creating predictability across varying policy issues. It can be
expected that a congressman who favors higher minimum wages will also favor lower
defense spending and affirmative action policies (Poole, 1997, 4). Thus, through analysis
of Poole and Rosenthal’s data-set, it is possible to gain an efficient understanding of
congressional voting patterns and behavior.
Yet, Poole and Rosenthal discuss several caveats of their research that must be
noted before their data are used for further study. Primarily, one must understand that the
ideological rankings received through their data do not lead to a predictive model on
specific issues. Poole and Rosenthal’s study gives political scientists the ability to predict
short-term voting results, but their study is not issue-driven. Poole and Rosenthal’s main
goal is to illustrate that vote mapping generally shows that voting will be consistent with
party ideological structure (Poole, 1997, 5).
Also, certain circumstances must be recognized when discussing aggregate shifts
in ideology. The main hypothesis of this research is that congressional ideology will
moderate in the face of diminishing electoral margins. However, this hypothesis works
under a critical assumption, and one that must be discussed. This hypothesis assumes that
all US House districts are moderate, yet this is not entirely true. As Bernstein (1988)
suggests, the median voter in congressional districts are not always closer to an
opponent’s ideology. For instance, some districts are quite conservative or liberal. Let us
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assume that Congressman Y, with a 0.2 ideology, serves in a heavily conservative district
where the median voter is a 0.6. In the last several elections, his margin of victory has
shrunk substantially. How would Congressman Y act in order to reverse this trend?
Contrary to the original hypothesis, Congressman Y would become increasingly
conservative to regain the votes he had lost. Although this instance would, in fact,
support the theory that is being tested, its occurrence within the data set would skew the
results of a correlation study. Using proper control factors, discussed in the forthcoming
section on independent variables, allows the regression analysis to avoid the data from
working against itself.

B. DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Ideology will be the main dependent variable for this study. Poole and Rosenthal
(2005) will serve as the data source for defining ideology, and it is important to discuss
the exact parameters of Poole and Rosenthal’s definition of “ideology”. The data set they
use ranks each representative throughout the history of Congress on a scale from -1 to 1,
and this study has cross examined this variable against several others.
Studies by both David Mayhew (1974, 1975) and Morris Fiorina (1982) have
discussed the importance of voting ideology and its relation to congressional success.
Mayhew has theorized that the primary goal of congressional work is reelection, and such
a theory could be supported through the results of this study. Ideology is a strong,
unbiased baseline to study congressional behavior. As a measure of congressional

17

actions, ideology will be calculated against a variety of variables, most notably election
returns, to see how ideology varies in response to changes in electoral security.
Why exactly is ideology a strong measure to compare with electoral results?
Ideology is measured based on the actual voting behavior of all House members
throughout history. As such, there is no selection bias or issues of over-selection or
under-selection of certain groups; every congressional member is selected. However, it
must be noted that some election data was removed before the regression data was
compiled, and this will be discussed shortly.
However, because this study intends to demonstrate dynamic ideological shifts
occurring by members pressured by reelection, the W-NOMINATE (which will be
referred to as WNOM through this paper) and DW-Nominate scores provided by Poole
and Rosenthal will not suffice. The DW-Nominate scores themselves create a “best line”
scenario within the WNOM data points. The DW- Nominate line creates a trend line over
the career of each congressman. Because the effectiveness of this study depends on the
dynamic changes between each Congress, an average line will not effectively measure
ideological shift. This is shown below.

Table 1.
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Thus, several derivative measures were calculated using this data to resolve this issue.
Poole and Rosenthal did not include this study’s main complex variable within their
original discussion and ideology data, however Keith Poole (2005) discusses the efficacy
and theory behind the variable constructed for this study’s data in his most recent book.
According to Poole, the WNOM scores essentially serve as a “static” version of
the D-Nominate scores released by Poole and Rosenthal (Poole, 1997, 249). The scores
correspond to individual ideology scores, by Congress, for a given representative. For
instance, Table 2 below shows Congressman Christopher Shays (R-CT) and his
individual WNOM Scores:

Congress
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

WNOM
0.066
0.108
0.123
0.120
0.149
0.131
0.216
0.211
Table 2.

These WNOM values can be analyzed against electoral margins to see if there are
any correlations between high WNOM values and high electoral margins. This measure
would simply be the WNOM value at point (t). As will be discussed shortly, although this
is an effective way to measure ideological change, it not the soundest model. In the
previous example, Mr. Shays’ congressional record shows a trend of becoming more
conservative with increasing seniority, yet the unique changes within the trend will
indicate whether individual elections are affecting his decision-making. The change in
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DW Ideology for Representative Shays, as indicated by the best line depicted in Table 1,
would be an approximate conservative shift of 0.012 for each Congress he has served.
Although it seems useful to use Poole’s WNOM to decipher the change in
ideology across congressional terms, using this variable would present a methodological
problem. Poole’s WNOM variable simply uses WNOM score for each congressman in a
given Congress, creating a value to correlate with other variables, in this case, electoral
margins.
Poole touched on this topic in a 1993 study where he subtracted WNOM at (t-1)
from WNOM (t) to find the difference between two Congresses. Yet, the straight WNOM
scores present a problem with this process. This study intends to isolate electoral stress as
the cause for congressional ideological moderation. Many studies, including the seniority
measure of this study, have indicated that there is a correlation between seniority and
ideology. While some studies (Strattman, 2000; Elling, 1982) have suggested a negative
correlation between seniority and ideological polarization, there are others that have
suggested the opposite result. However, it seems certain that career trends in ideology do
exist for many congressional leaders, whether positive or negative, and must be dealt
with to isolate the remainder of unexplained ideological change.
Therefore, to remove career trend data from the explanatory variable, these data
must be subtracted from the WNOM margins between each Congress. Poole and Romer’s
study in 1993 found no connection between electoral margins and ideology, however
there were several problems with their study. First, Poole did not subtract this trend data,
which he acknowledges in his most recent writing (2005). According to Poole, the DW
trend line should be subtracted because it enables us “to compute a shift distance for
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every legislator between Congresses, controlling for the linear time trend” (Poole, 2004,
173). Thus, this study employs Poole’s most updated theoretical process by subtracting
the DW trend line from the change in WNOM, effectively leaving the remaining
ideological change possibly explained by electoral pressure, as this study suggests.
Throughout this paper, this will be referred to as either the “complex” model, or as the
distance between the change in WNOM minus the change in DW (DCWDDW). This is
shown for Congressman Shays in Table 3:

Congress

WNOM

Change
WNOM

DWNOMINATE

Change
DW_Ideology

100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

0.066
0.108
0.123
0.120
0.149
0.131
0.216
0.211

--0.042
0.015
-0.003
0.029
-0.018
0.085
-0.005

0.078
0.090
0.102
0.115
0.127
0.139
0.151
0.164

--0.017
0.017
0.017
0.018
0.017
0.017
0.017

DCWDDW

--0.025
-0.002
-0.020
0.011
-0.035
0.068
-0.022
Table 3.

Although the remaining margin values become very small in many cases, this is a critical
process of the study.
Nevertheless, the DCWDDW process is not the final step in transforming the
central dependent variable of the “Complex Model” of this study. To run the data set
together, the WNOM scores must be put into partisan form. In effect, the -1 to 1 scale
must be transformed into a positive scale to keep Democratic and Republican data from
moving in opposite directions. Thus, the main dependent variable for the Complex Model
becomes partisan distance (PDCWDDW). To construct this variable, the partisan
measure is the same as the main distance measure for Republicans, but for Democrats,
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ideology is multiplied by -1. All third party representatives are coded as missing. Many
studies focus on incumbents versus challengers or Republicans versus Democrats,
however, the crux of this study is the electoral security of each representative. Shifting
the scale positive for both parties enables the regression analyses to be run on the full
data set, and subsequently to show simultaneous shifts between ideological extremity and
moderation for both Republicans and Democrats.

C. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

To study the effect of electoral vote margins upon ideology, it is important to use
a variety of other variables that have been studied by other scholars. Although many of
these variables will be important in discussing the exact effects of congressional
ideological shifts and electoral margins, they will mostly serve as control variables. By
using control variables in conjunction with the main independent variable, the results of
the study will hold more weight. Moreover, additional variables enable the data to be
compared and contrasted with previous scholarly studies on congressional behavior.
The main independent variable for this study will be vote margins in
congressional elections. Primary documentation of election results is critical in
developing a statistical analysis on electoral pressure. These results, for the House of
Representatives, were distributed by Gary King (1994), through the Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research, and also, through the Office of the Clerk
(Election Statistics, 2005). Yet, to wholly examine voting behavior, there are a number of
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extremely useful formats for election results. First, for congressional elections, a vote
count “by-district” would be necessary to compose the election return margins that will
be cross-examined against the dependent variable of congressional voting behavior.
Election totals consist of vote totals, by district, for the Republican and Democratic
candidate in each election.
Because of the official nature of such data, they are quite reliable. Election returns
from earlier congresses often provided conflicting and erroneous data, which is why they
are omitted. Gary King’s election data, which begin in the 56th Congress, proved to be
extremely reliable through cross-checking the numbers with those of the US Clerk, and
so the 56th Congress is where the regression data begin for this study. Logically, electoral
vote margins serve as an important indicator of constituent ideology and approval, two
factors critical to incumbent representatives in their pursuit of reelection.
Methodologically, several by-products of this basic election data create the main
independent variable for this study. First, Winning Percent Margin is a critical variable,
and it is defined as the percentage difference in votes between the winner and loser of
each election. This variable is used for the Simple Model, which contrasts Winning
Percent Margin against WNOM. Winning percent margin allows a regression to measure
whether elevated winning percentages correlate with ideological extremity.
Meanwhile, Change in Winning Percent Margin serves as the main independent
variable in the “Complex” Model. How has the electoral security of each representative
increased or decreased since the previous election? Effectively, this variable measures
whether each election for Congressman X is becoming more or less difficult. Change in
Winning Percent is constructed by taking the difference between the Winning Percent
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Margin at (t) and the Winning Percent Margin at (t-1). It is then juxtaposed against
PDCWDDW to illuminate shifts within already heightened electoral margins or
ideological extremity. For example, while Winning Percent Margin might show that a
60% margin of victory will correlate with a 0.5 ideology, using Change in Winning
Percent as the independent variable enables the regression to note any corresponding
ideological shifts when that margin increases to 65% in the following term.
As previously mentioned, the data set originally included all House Members and
terms between the 56th and 107th Congresses, however several omissions must be made.
In unique circumstances, election data was coded as -9 within Gary King’s data set.
Circumstances where this occurred include elections involving independent parties, and
other irregularities. In most instances, these data were removed. Also, there were
instances where Republican or Democratic candidates ran completely unopposed, without
election. King coded such data as -1, and this occurred most prevalently in Louisiana,
Florida, and several other Southern states. These data were also removed in most
instances. The quantity of figures used for each regression is recorded within the tables
located in the upcoming section of results.
Additionally, region of the country is an important variable in studying
congressional ideology. The nation will be coded by region and by state. James Campbell
(1992) has done a great deal of research on state and regional voting patterns, and has
actually devised an equation that uses several variables to predict how a state will vote in
presidential elections. It is expected that regions that are generally more conservative or
liberal will be represented by congressmen whose ideologies are particularly polarized.
The South and West will be notably conservative, while the Northeast will be notably
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liberal. Most important to these analyses will be the Northeast and West, as the South
displays numerous electoral anomalies and realignment that may affect its role as a
control (Jacobson, 2004, 237).
Party will also serve as a variable, but in combination with region. The two
interact together, and are used separately in discussing whether certain regions are
represented by more ideologically polarized representatives. Party is coded as 0 for
Democratic House members and 1 for Republican House members. Congressional voting
behavior is influenced by party pressure, and party affiliation also works strongly with
regional politics. Regions that are generally more conservative or liberal will exhibit
strong party affiliation, and therefore, display more extreme viewpoints on issues.
Further, tenure in office is measured within this study in absolute terms, by the
number of terms a congressman has served in office. Thomas Strattman (2000) has
approached congressional behavior from the angle of tenure. According to Strattman’s
research, junior congressmen are more likely to vote with their party line, and party
voting decreases with seniority. Also, congressmen who have served longer in office will
exhibit less ideological shift than their shorter-tenured colleagues. Seniority plays a
crucial role, as approximately 80% of the congressional data points in the study involve
congressmen who have served two or more terms. It is expected that congressmen who
have served longer in office will hold more extreme viewpoints.
Similar to tenure, a critical variable for this study is whether the winning
candidate in a given race was an incumbent. For this study, incumbents were coded as 1,
while all challengers, open seat races, multiple incumbent races, and other possibilities
are coded as 0. Incumbency plays a similar role to seniority in this study, as incumbency
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helps identify trends of tenured congressmen. Yet, incumbency is also important because
it identifies all unique races that do not feature an incumbent versus a challenger, which
occurs about 22% of the time between 1898 and 2002 (Arnold, 1990, 49-51).
Another variable of study is presidential election results, by state. A count of
presidential election results “by-district” would be the most effective independent
variable to juxtapose against electoral and congressional voting results. Will a president’s
level of popularity within a given representative’s district create any voting variation?
However, these data were unattainable, leaving statewide data as the only alternative.
Presidential vote margins and data are calculated through the same procedures as
congressional election results (absolute difference and percentage difference). There are
two variables which are used in the regression models as controls. The first variable used
codes whether the winning president is of each congressman’s party, coded as “0” if
different, and “1” if the same. Second, the statewide percentage margin of the presidential
candidate of a congressman’s party is used within the regression models. Scholars
suggest that presidential elections have a moderate effect on congressional elections, and
this variable will be studied as it correlates with success of same party candidates. This
variable is significant, as previous research has suggested that presidential success has a
negative effect on the success of opposing party congressional candidates.
Moreover, presidential results serve as a safeguard against ideological regions that
have the potential to skew the congressional data. In regions where representatives are
more moderate than the median voter, vanishing congressional electoral margins would
lead to increased ideological polarity, as an attempt to corral a larger cross-section of
supporters. Unfortunately, presidential results by district are unavailable to use for this
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purpose, which leaves statewide results. Even so, presidential results within the data set
help to identify and control for such highly polarized regions.
Additionally, Thorson and Stambough (1995) have studied the effects of
presidential coattails, and believe it to be an important factor of electoral margins. Some
suggest that coattails have an effect on close congressional races. Buck (1972) asserts that
congressmen will actually shift their policy support in favor of the president when the
president commands a substantial margin of victory in their districts. Consequently, there
should be a positive relationship between presidential success in a district and the success
of congressional candidates of the same party in that district. This second dimension of
Presidential success adds to the effectiveness of presidential election results as a control
within the regression analysis.
Institutional structures of divided government and divided Congress will be
studied to see how each affects congressional voting behavior. Divided government
occurs when the executive branch is controlled by a different party than the majority
party in Congress. Divided Congress occurs when the House and Senate are each
controlled by a different party. John Coleman (1999) has argued that divided government
leads to legislative moderation, but lowers productivity.
For this study, several controls related to divided or unified government and
Congress are used. First, the variable Divided Government is coded as 0 in the case of
unified government and is coded as 1 in the case of divided government. Second, the
variable Unified Congress is coded as 0 during unified Congress and is coded as 1 when
Congress is divided. Third, the percentage of seats in the entire house that a
congressman’s party holds will serve as another control factor for the House. Moreover,
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the percentage of seats in the senate that a representative’s party holds is a control factor.
Government and Congressional institutional controls are effective within regression
models to ensure that unique institutional factors are not skewing member ideological
results.
Last, ideological side is an important variable for several of the regressions. For
several of the regression models (which will be discussed in the methods section),
ideological distance served as the main dependent variable of the model. Thus,
ideological side is an important control variable, as it codes whether the member’s
ideological mean is less than or equal to zero (a liberal), or greater than zero (a
conservative). There are House members whose ideological score sit on the opposite side
of the spectrum from their party. In such cases, holding that representative’s party as his
main ideological classification could distort the data. For instance, if a Republican with a
-0.2 rating moved to a 0.0 rating in the next congressional term, standard classification
would categorize that Republican as becoming increasingly moderate, when, in actuality,
he is becoming more conservative. Thus, ideological side keeps unique ideological cases
from damaging the effectiveness of the model. This effect is shown in the representation
below:
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Essentially, what this diagram shows is that although Republican Congressman X
may move toward 0, he is becoming more extreme. In itself, this idea is somewhat
counterintuitive, yet it is important to understand. The assumption of this study is that
Republicans and Democrats are ideologically extreme, and correspond to the ideology of
their own party. Democrats are close to -1, while Republicans are close to 1. Thus, for a
Republican, any move in the direction of -1 is ideological moderation, while any move
toward 1 is becoming more ideologically extreme. For a Democrat, the exact opposite is
true. Essentially, the actual starting position of representative along the spectrum does not
matter; it is the direction of the shift that is significant.

D. METHODOLOGY

The working theory of this study is that legislators in Congress are inherently
ideologically extreme. To study such a theory, a variety of methods can be used. For this
particular research project, the design will focus on linear regression analysis and
correlation studies of the previously discussed variables. Most importantly, primary
documentation of election results is critical in developing a statistical analysis on
electoral pressure.
There are two main types of design that can be used for the regression analysis
within this study; pooled cross-sectional regression, and cross-sectional time-series
regression. A pooled cross-sectional analysis involves individual members stacked within
individual groups. For this particular study, congressmen are not uniform across each
Congress, making this method somewhat unusable. Although pooled regression can be
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used for basic correlations of election and ideological data, a more versatile regression
model is necessary for this analysis. Instead, this study uses a cross-sectional time-series
model. Because members overlap across different sections of the data set, the regression
must be put together as a time-series.
Additionally, a cross-sectional time-series regression with lags is used for this
data set. Because each Congress is essentially its own static entity, it makes sense to use
this statistical method. Lagged regression controls for first-order autocorrelation, as it
recognizes that while the data is connected and a trend exists within the data set, different
Congresses may act as distinct groups in certain situations.
The actual regression data will be run using the statistical program STATA. There
are several measures within the regression data which are used to decipher the validity of
the regression measures. The first important measure is the overall R-squared measure for
each run of the data set. The R-squared measure indicates how much variance within the
data can be explained by the main variable. For most analyses discussed in the
forthcoming section, the R-squared measurement is above 0.1.
Moreover, the regression data include a measure that shows the confidence that a given
probability percentage of the data falls within two standard deviations. For most studies,
a 95% confidence interval is the general cutoff. Within such a deviation spread, the P > |
z | measure should be below 0.05 to provide significant results. However, the data for this
study does not lie within a standard deviation spread. The theory itself leads to a
suggestion that the data falls in a directional pattern. Because of the directional nature of
this data set, an acceptable probability interval would include 90% of the data. Similarly,
the P > | z | measure must be below 0.1 for values to have significance.
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III. Results

A. FULL DATA SET

The function of this study is to show that a relationship exists between electoral
margins and House member ideological polarity. Through several models of regression
analysis, a relationship is found between these two variables. This study uses two
particular models which have been discussed in the previous section. The first model,
termed the Simple Model, involves the WNOM variable and Winning Percent Margins
for members of the House. Essentially, this model measures whether representatives in
the House become more or less extreme over time with increasing electoral margins.
One of the main benefits of this study is that it involves mostly complete data
over the last 106 years of congressional history. As such, the most important regression
was run using the full data set. As can be seen in Table 4 at the back of this paper,
variable of interest, Winning Percent Margin, was statistically insignificant in the Simple
Model. This occurs for several possible reasons. First, this model uses electoral margins
rather than change in margins. Second, the Simple Model correlates whether a positive
relationship exists between high margins and extreme ideology by comparing the data
with dummy variables. While this method is not incorrect, it may be too simple for such
an expansive data set, as individual congresses are not necessarily comparable.
Thus, the Complex Model, using PDCWDDW, is the most effective model. Poole
and Romer (1993) used WNOM at time (t) minus WNOM at time (t-1) for their original
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study. While Poole and Romer’s independent variable of electoral margins obtained
insignificant results, additional characteristics of their study should be noted. As
previously mentioned, Poole (2005) discussed several shortcomings of his model. Poole
advocated subtracting the DW line from the WNOM data for future regressions, which
has been done in the Complex Model for this study. Additionally, the variable within this
study has been transformed into a positive scale using the partisan measure.
Consequently, the PDCWDDW measure is an improved version of Poole’s most recent
research.
The Complex Model (Table 4) indicates a positive relationship between Change
in Winning Percent and PDCWDDW. The P > | z | measure of 0.077 and R-squared of
0.1379 indicate that the positive coefficient is statistically significant. Because the
dependent variable measures partisan ideological change, this value essentially means
that as representatives increase their winning margins, their ideology becomes more
extreme.
Yet, Poole and Romer (1993) still looms when reviewing this result. While
several of the reasons for their insignificant measure of ideology and electoral margins
have been listed, there is one additional reason. Poole and Romer’s data set spanned the
80th to 97th Congresses. Of course, the choice of using these particular Congresses was
not made because of the electoral margins control variable within their study. Thus, there
are two potentially critical problems with this choice. First, the data set for their study is
somewhat small, in contrast with the more extensive analysis provided in this study (56th
Congress to the 107th Congress). Using a larger set of data helps to control for short-term
confounding variables. Secondly, scholars have noted the rise of strong parties during the
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early 1980s, which corresponds with the 97th Congress. Strong party structure has a
considerable impact on ideological shirking, and will be discussed later in this section. In
essence, Poole and Romer’s study may lack the most vital years of Congressional
ideological polarization, making the data of this study’s Complex Model a noteworthy
upgrade.
Upon review of the model, the results of the remaining variables are consistent
with previous scholarly analyses. The Seniority variable is significant, and indicates a
positive correlation with changing electoral margins. Many previous studies on
congressional tenure have noted this relationship. Meanwhile, the President of Your Party
variable is significant and positive. This relationship effectively represents that the party
in control is slightly more extreme than the party not in power. This may indicate that
members of the majority party have enough access to power that they are better able to
take stronger ideological positions. Congressmen within the minority party may hold
moderate partisan positions to counterbalance a lack of access to the presidency.
Similarly, during times of divided Congress and divided government, the
Complex Model provides significant results that representatives become increasingly
ideological. The correlations provided by the model are positive, with fairly significant
90% confidence values. These results may indicate that member ideological polarity is
more common during divided government. It is possible that during periods of divided
government, a stronger adversarial system develops within the House and Senate.
Essentially, both vertical and horizontal divisions in Congress correlate with an
increasing polarization of Congress.
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Lastly, the PDCWDDW variable with lags provides a negative correlation with
electoral margin shifts. Effectively, this means that when a representatives ideology
becomes more extreme, he is pressured to bring his position back toward the middle,
leading to a general decrease in the rate of change in ideology during the following term.
At the same time, the lagged term for the Simple Model was significant and positive.
While these two models would seem on first glance to contradict each other, in fact they
do not. The dynamic of this relationship is shown in the illustration below:

The above illustration represents a general conclusion that might be inferred from
both the Simple and the Complex Model. The significant and positive lagged dependent
term in the Simple Model suggests that there is a positive trend of a member’s ideology
over time. Effectively, representatives tend to become more ideological the longer that
they are in Congress. The significant but negative lagged dependent term in the Complex
Model suggests that the rate of the ideological change over time decreases. In other
words, members may asymptotically reach close to an equilibrium ideology.
Although the Simple Model may not work well on Winning Percent Margins and
ideology, much of the remainder of the data prove to be quite significant as controls.
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Because the Simple Model uses the same data set as the Complex Model, the results
shown in Table 4 depict the veracity of the hypotheses. Variables for the Northeast, West,
Party, and Seniority were all highly significant and positively correlated with ideology.
For region, the regression results indicate that House members from the Northeast and
West are generally more ideologically extreme than members from the South. This is a
logical result, as these regions are accepted by scholars as being ideologically extreme
and more uniform than the South.

B. FULL DATA SET, BY PARTY

Breaking down the data by party provides some of the most intriguing results, as
shown in Table 5. The Democratic Party seems to follow the theory within this study
much more closely than the Republican Party. For Democrats, using the Simple Model,
House winning percent is significant and positive, with an impressive R-squared value of
0.8161. Over time, Democrats solidly increase margins and ideology. The Complex
Model echoes the results of the Simple Model, providing a significant and positive
relationship with an R-squared value of 0.1334. Accordingly, Democratic representatives
in the House may be particularly constrained by electoral factors.
Meanwhile, according to regression analysis of the data, the same cannot be said
about Republicans. Winning Percent and Change in Winning Percent led to insignificant
results for both the Simple and Complex Models. Although this study presents no exact
explanation for this insignificance within the Republican data, it is likely that some
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intrinsic dissimilarity may exist between the party structures of the Democratic and
Republican parties. To study this relationship, it would be necessary to include additional
measures of party strength, cohesion, and leadership to interpret variation of party line
voting across each party.
Nevertheless, both Democratic and Republican data provide several strong control
measures to endorse these findings. While it would seem that perhaps the Republican
data is incomplete, many of the other measures provide significant and expected results.
For example, in Table 5, it can be seen that Republicans have a significant and negative
correlation in the Northeast. This means that Republicans in the Northeast trend more
moderate over time, which, in light of the increasing liberalization of the Northeast,
seems as expected. Similarly, the lagged PCDWDDW variable works in the same
directions for the Simple and Complex Models for both Republicans and Democrats,
helping to indicate that there is not a specific problem with the Republican data. The
substantiation of this Republican data leads to questions concerning how Republicans and
Democrats handle changing electoral margins differently.
Yet, what are the implications of this difference? Several possibilities can be
conjectured to explain this discrepancy. First, it is possible that Democrats are simply
better at being responsive to the electorate. When electoral margins widen, they
predictably and uniformly move toward their own ideologically polar stances.
Effectively, Democrats are particularly exhibitive of the popular model of representation.
Electoral slack allows Democrats to polarize, but otherwise, Democrats moderate their
stances to maintain office and mirror the ideology if their constituency.
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Meanwhile, Republicans seem to ignore cues from the constituency. Republicans
do not shift their ideology congruent to shifts in electoral margins. What can explain this
facet of Republican representation? It is possible that Republicans exhibit the trustee
model of representation. In essence, Republicans believe that the constituency entrusts in
them the responsibility to vote their conscience. Regardless of shrinking electoral
margins, Republicans do not shift their ideology. If this is the case, Republicans can be
seen as inflexible in their ideological positions, unwilling to stay ideologically
representative of their shifting districts.

C. PARTIAL DATA SET, BY WEAK/STRONG PARTIES

In the prior discussion concerning Poole and Romer (1993), it is mentioned that
their study did not include data from the period of strong parties. This period includes the
97th Congress up through present day Congress, or the 107th for this study. Scholars have
identified a strong rise in party cohesion, party leadership, and ideological separation
during this period (Poole,1997; Abramowitz, 2001). A representation of party
polarization from Keith Poole’s website is shown below:
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(Graph courtesy of Keith Poole, http://voteview.com/Polarized_America.htm)

During strong party periods, as witnessed in the last twenty-five years, rising
electoral margins more strongly correlate with polarized ideology. The basic theory
behind this study is that congressmen are inherently ideologically extreme, and it is
elections that reel members back into the moderate viewpoints shared by mainstream
America. In essence, party polarization helps to shield incumbent congressmen. At the
same time, the electorate itself becomes polarized, leaving Representatives adequately
able to manifest their ideological polarity.
The aforementioned theoretical basis for ideological extremity during strong party
periods is corroborated within this study by the Complex Model. In fact, while the
Complex Model is statistically demanding, the data for the strong parties regression
provides the strongest coefficient and most significant measure (P > |z| = 0.02) of all
38

PDCWDDW model regressions up to this point. Ideological shirking by members is thus
affected by the political atmosphere within which it occurs.
As expected, periods of weak parties provide insignificant results of ideological
shift by Representatives. When party structure is weak, incumbents are not protected by a
strong party structure and ideological divide. The electorate becomes increasingly
moderate, which serves to reel Congressman further toward the middle, in spite of rising
electoral returns. Party structure in Congress may be a critical component to member
ideological shirking.

D. STRONG PARTIES: A CLOSER LOOK

Because Republican and Democratic data varied immensely for the full data set, it
would be expected that a congruent variation will occur within the partial data set. The
Democratic data for the full data set was particularly effective in showcasing the
relationship advocated by this study, and subsequently, the Democratic data for strong
parties should be increasingly effective. The results of this regression reverberate this
expectation (Table 7), with the coefficient for the Democratic split of the strong party
data at 0.012, the highest overall significant value for PDCWDDW, and with a P > |z| of
only 0.016. Basically, when party structure and polarization is strong, as is the case in
today’s political arena, Democrats are particularly restrained by electoral margins.
Similar to the results of the full dataset, Republican measures are insignificant for
strong party regressions (Table 7). Because of the strength of ideological shirking within
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strong parties, it is surprising that Republican values remain insignificant for both the
Simple and Complex Models. The institutional factors that create this inconsistency
between Republicans and Democrats clearly remains steadily in existence through
periods of both weak and strong parties.
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IV. FINAL THOUGHTS

Elected officials in the United States maintain a unique and shifting relationship
with their constituents, creating interplay between a representative’s ideological
extremity and his desires to maintain political office. As election margins grow and the
offices of congressmen become safe, they more readily exhibit their intrinsic ideological
polarity. This study answers several questions about elections and ideology, while
creating several others. Is representative ideological moderation bad for democracy, or is
it a useful mechanism to counterbalance innate political extremity within our elected
officials? While an answer to this question is not resolved by this study, it is a fascinating
matter that must be decided by the electorate.
Additionally, the innate differences between the Republican and Democratic
parties shown within this study are an interesting topic of discussion. While Democrats
and Republicans are typically thought to only differ in their ideological stances, there
actually appears to be a more dynamic relationship between the two parties. Why do
Republicans seemingly ignore shifts in electoral success when formulating their
ideological positions? Why are Democrats more willing to ideologically polarize when
gauging an electoral vote of confidence from their constituents? Effectively, the
underlying perception of representation within each party may be unique. While
Democrats are more responsive to electoral cues by the electorate, Republicans are more
static, taking a trustee approach to representation. Recognizing such an intrinsic
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difference between the Democratic and Republican parties is critical in understanding
party and member behavior.
Nevertheless, what is the utilitarian usefulness for society to understand
representative ideological moderation? What is the value of this study for the average
voter? While on first glance it may only seem to provide interesting reading material for
academics and those captivated by politics, the correlation between election margins and
ideology within this study is, in fact, vital to the electorate. Foremost, by understanding
how election results affect congressional representation, the electorate can determine the
effectiveness of political activism. While a majority of representatives occupy safe seats
in the House, this study indicates that reducing an incumbent victor’s electoral margins
can help to moderate his policies in future Congresses. Cues by the electorate play a
larger role within the voting decisions of incumbent Representatives than is assumed by
the average American. This study itself serves as a potent endorsement for increased
voter participation, even in districts where challengers lack the resources and support to
closely challenge an incumbent Representative.
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